Studies of political culture have long emphasized the importance of trust for effective democratic governance. Social trust is important because it lubricates cooperative relationships; serves as the foundation of community, facilitates and reduces the costs of collective action in societies that might otherwise be plagued by atomized individuals (Putnam, 1993; Almond, 1963; Fukayama, 1995) . Trusting individuals are more likely to be political engaged, more likely to care about their communities, more likely to be involved in voluntary associations; more likely to be involved in economic transactions outside immediate networks, and more likely to expand on their networks, personal contacts, and relationships. In short, trusting individuals are more likely to hold the values deemed important for democracy (Ulsaner, 2002; Prezeworski, 1991) . Larry Diamond skillfully summarizes these functions of social trust: "Social trust and cooperativeness, and overarching commitments to the system, the nation, and the community moderate the conflicts and bridge the cleavages of politics." In his formulation, social trust is integral to a political culture that not only enables but also supports democracy. 2 In fact, many studies examining aggregate data on trust have found that trust is highly correlated to effective democratic governance (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; and Muller and Seligson, 1994) .
The correlation between trust and democratic government has opened several new debates, in which two overarching themes have become particularly visible. The first examines the source from which trust emerges. From what cultural dynamic does trust arise? Is trust based on early socialization patterns? Or is it in fact structured by actual experiences and evaluations of those experiences? The debate between cultural models and performance-based models of trust has not yet been fully fleshed out. 3 The cultural model holds that "modern man" or the "civic nation" can be traced to the cultural roots of communities. Some societies, because of their socialization patterns and historical trajectories, are more trusting of others (Ulsaner, 2004) . Because trust exists in these societies, individuals are more likely to cooperate with others and work for the common good. In these formulations, pre-existing cultural tendencies that facilitate trusting relationships between individuals bode well for a democratic political culture.
Other scholars view these cultural arguments with skepticism, arguing that trust in others is in fact a function of institutional evaluation. Where state or government institutions protect citizen interests, citizens are more likely to be trusting (Levi, 1996; Hardin 1997; Offe, 2000; Knight, 2000) . Rose and Mishler, for instance, claim that the debate between cultural and performance-based models of trust can be reduced to an 'what has society done for me lately?'" 4 While the first model is more cultural in essence, the second relies on actual experiences.
Leaving aside these differences for the moment, proponents of both formulations which rely on individual level models (ignoring the ways in which institutions mediate the utility of trust) tacitly agree that trust-whatever its source-is an essential 3 Abramson (1983) offers a good discussion of this distinction as cited by Rose and Mishler, 1997. 4 Rose and Mishler (1997) , pg 34.
characteristic for the promotion of democracy. Current studies working from a presumption of democracy seem to substantiate these findings. Putnam finds that higher levels of trust lead to more cooperative relations, which in turn lead to more effective democratic governance. And Inglehart finds that aggregate levels of trust are highly correlated to consolidated democracies (1991) .
Underlying these theoretical approaches is the assumption that trust, in and of itself, is beneficial for, useful to, and desirable for democratic outcomes. Put simply, higher levels of trust are presumed to be a correlate of democracy. Cooperation among strangers-that is, cooperation in societies that have become more individualized-is essential to reshaping notions of community. Cooperation transforms the "I" into the "we," which enables better democracy (Putnam, 1993) . In these already democratic contexts, social trust helps sustain and promote democratic effectiveness. But why should trust promote more democratic effectiveness in societies not guided by democratic institutions. If in democracies, trust helps citizens "make use" of existing democratic institutions, like collective mobilization, the right to associate, freedom of expression, and the right to pursue economic opportunities, wouldn't it also be logical that trust would help citizens living in non-democratic countries to make use of existing nondemocratic institutions? Trusting neighbors in an authoritarian regime may feel more comfortable revealing to one another about potential clientelistic perks. These disclosures, enabled by trust, may very well serve as an impetus motivating people to seek similar governmental privileges. If trust in democracies enables people to work together to benefit democracy, why can't trust enable citizens in authoritarian regimes to benefit authoritarianism? Where societies lack trust, we are also told they lack democracy because they lack trust. And although trust may be a function of culture or institutions, individual level models nevertheless continue to applaud trust as a powerful predictor of more democratic political cultures.
In this paper, we subject this explicit reification of trust to a critical analysis. First, we contend that the democratic utility of trust is not consistent across the globe.
Individual level models often find that trust is associated to democratic outcomes, but these models lack a more nuanced understanding about the ways in which contextual factors influence the democratic utility of trust. More specifically, authoritarian regimes, too, are very much invested in inducing trust among the populace. Trusting citizens in settings that are less democratic are also more likely to cooperate and seek each other for help. Unlike democracies however, these levels of trust may serve the existing nondemocratic regime in power.
Citizens in authoritarian regimes, who are more trusting, can also work with others in ways that give further credibility to authoritarian governments. A more collectively oriented population might even relieve governments of responsibility towards their citizens. Further, in less democratic countries, clientelism and patronage are techniques often employed by governments to build constituency support and compliance. Not only do these factors generate support for the regime, but these very measures enhance levels of interpersonal trust among the population. Citizens who are more invested in and supportive of the existing regime (often a result of the degree to which they are beneficiaries of clientelism and patronage) are more likely to be trusting (Jamal, 2007) . Social trust, it appears, is not only useful for reinforcing democratic governments; it is also pertinent to authoritarian longevity as well. We therefore argue that the "democratic utility" of trust is in fact predicated upon the existence of democratic governing institutions. Higher levels of trust need not imply a democratically emerging polity. In fact, we argue that higher levels of trust are only useful to democracy in settings that are already democratic. The democratic utility of trust therefore is function of a county's democratic trajectory. In other words, trust without democracy has no democratic effect on its own.
Mechanisms Conditioned by Context
This paper advances two major arguments. Accepting the premise that social trust is structured by risk aversion, we argue that governing institutions play an important role in instilling levels of social trust (Levi, 1996; Hardin, 1996; Sizemptok, 1999) . In democracies, formal laws ensure that trusting relationships are not violated, and that a higher order-the rule of law-holds citizens accountable when breaches of confidence take place. In non-democracies, political access or linkages to authoritarian channels in the regime similarly increase accountability and general feelings of security. Therefore, we argue that governing institutions structure levels of social trust regardless of regimetype. This has an important implication for studies that have reified the concept of trust.
Because levels of social trust are structured by governing institutions, their operative capacities in non-democracies are different than in democracies. In democracies, higher levels of social trust allow for greater civic cooperation in ways important to democratic sustainability; in authoritarian settings, however, higher levels of social may result in the reinforcement of authoritarian rule. Hence, the democratic utility of trust varies among societies that are already democratic and those non-democratic.
Revisiting the Importance of Trust in a Cross-National Perspective: Hypotheses
To examine the extent to which trust is useful for democracy, it is first necessary to examine the relationship between trust and support for democracy cross-nationally.
Existing studies have often looked at aggregate levels of trust and compared them to aggregate objective scores on democracy to advance a common argument: Our first hypothesis, therefore, predicts that levels of trust will not be directly linked to support for democracy across the globe. Trust, in our estimation, is a function of risk-aversion (Hardin, 1997) . Where citizens feel protected they are more likely to be trusting towards others, regardless of political context. In democracies this means that citizens who enjoy equal protections are more likely to be trusting. Because they enjoy equal protections, a by-product of a functioning democratic society, they are more likely to be supportive of democracy as well. In non-democracies, individuals who are trusting also feel more protected. They can "afford" to trust because if a trusting relationship is violated they have adequate channels of political recourse. They have political access, often guaranteed and secured through clientelistic access. Yet, there is no compelling reason to assume that these levels of trust bode well for democracy. Why would citizens who already feel protected in authoritarian regimes-those citizens who are more trusting-be supportive of democracy-which would require regime change?
This brings us to our second hypothesis: the democratic utility of trust therefore is predicated upon already inclusive democratic institutions. Not only do cross-national levels of trust inconsistently map onto levels of support for democracy, but the claim that trust is linked to more democracy is also likely to manifest itself in countries that are democratizing or already democratic. The democratic utility of trust is more paramount in societies that are already democratic.
In authoritarian regimes, one would expect levels of social trust to naturally lag behind those of the democratic world. As Pippa Norris argues, "dissatisfaction with the performance of regimes characterized by widespread corruption, abuse of power and intolerance of dissent, can be regarded as a healthy reaction. Too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little" (27). In authoritarian states plagued with non-representative governments, citizens can rely less on effective institutions to secure and protect their interests (Hardin, 1997) . According to these formulations, lower levels of trust in nondemocratic states should be unsurprising. It should also be unsurprising, then, that levels of social trust should be lower in non-democratic states. Without the guarantees of equal protection, fairness in treatment, and judicial recourse, citizens are less likely to be trusting of others. Only those citizens who feel protected by existing (non-democratic) political institutions are more likely to be trusting. Yet, these levels of trust have little to do with support for democracy.
Alternative Hypotheses and Explanations
Our argument thus far suggests that context matters. More specifically, the availability of democratic channels of participation determines the extent to which social trust becomes meaningful for democracy. Several alternative contextually-driven hypotheses, however, may also explain the democratic utility of trust.
First, aggregate levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and individual levels of income, signs of economic growth and development, may influence the nature of trust in given societies. Two arguments plausibly emerge from the inclusion of economic considerations. First, higher levels of income-regardless of aggregate levels of GDPmay enable citizens to feel more protected and secure. Szompka sums up the advantages of income on levels of trust: "[A] crucial personal trait of the trustee is the possession of resources that may be treated as a collateral or insurance of obligations." 5 As a result, well-to-do citizens across the globe may be more trusting than their less-well-to-do counterparts, regardless of regime-type. However, we still argue that the democratic utility of that trust will be predicated upon the availability of democratic institutions.
Although richer citizens in authoritarian regimes may be more trusting, these levels of trust need not be linked for greater support for democracy. Second, aggregate levels of GDP-and not the democratic context of regimes-may structure the democratic valence of trust. One may plausibly argue that where societies as a whole are better-off, intersocietal competition over scarce resources decreases in ways that bode well for citizens to simultaneously be trusting and support democracy. Rothstein and Ulsaner (2006), for instance, have found that reducing economic inequality prefigures increasing levels of social trust. Brhen and Rahm argue that, because "[s]carcity increases the risks of misplaced trust," it is plausible that "hard economic times may lead people to be less generous in their views of others, who may instead be viewed as competitors… People may begin to feel exploited by others, thus diminishing their faith in their fellow citizens." 6 An alternative hypothesis we explore, therefore, is whether economic rather than democratic institutions shape the democratic utility trust.
Second, another probable explanation contends that religion and religiosity shape the democratic utility of trust. At the individual level, one would expect more observant individuals and those more likely to attend religious institutions to hold higher levels of trust because these narrow networks of participation increase levels of trust. However, these levels of trust would not necessarily foreshadow democracy since they are shaped by more traditional understandings of authority. Trust increased by the mechanisms of religious observance, it is argued, do not bode well for democracy (Putnam, 1993) .
Building on this religiosity hypothesis, it is also imperative to examine another alternative explanation which is more culturally oriented. Perhaps regime type does not matter; in fact, levels of tolerance at the societal levels determine the democratic utility of trust. Individuals may be more trusting due to narrow networks, strong family ties, or greater incomes, yet those levels of trust may mean nothing for democracy because citizens may exhibit potentially harmful levels of intolerance.
Fourth, and building on this last set of hypotheses, we also will examine another cultural determinant in shaping the democratic utility of trust: traditional predispositions.
In order to tap into traditional values we use an index established by Inglehart and Baker (2000) . Finally, yet another alternative hypothesis would hold that authoritarian predispositions-and not those necessarily shaped by religious beliefs or observancemay determine whether levels of trust carry any democratic utility. In other words, citizens across the globe may reject democratic forms of governance and instead support authoritarian patterns of rule, like strong leaders and weak or inefficient parliaments. This predisposition towards authoritarian rule may be influenced by security concerns, or it may be a response to colonial legacies. Nevertheless, societies that are more authoritarian may be trusting, but that trust does not directly correlate with greater support for democracy.
Data and Variables
The argument laid out above suggests that whether social trust conduces to support for democracy depends on whether individuals live in 'free' societies. Where access to the state is predicated upon clientelistic networks, social trust is in fact counterproductive. Here trust will tend to build strong in-groups that allow individuals to benefit from state largesse, which a move to democracy would threaten. In such contexts, therefore, we would expect trust to be negatively correlated with democratic support. Since our primary interest is the determinants of support for democracy, we begin by discussing the measurement of our dependent variable. Democratic support is a diffuse concept. The WVS asks respondents whether it is good to have a democratic political system. While such a question gets directly at our concerns, it is inadequate as a sole measure of democratic support because it evinces little variation to exploit-of the 105,000 people who answered the question fewer than 10 per cent considered having a democratic system 'bad' or 'very bad.' Clearly democracy, as a political principle anyway, is ascendant and enjoys cross-national mass support.
To gain empirical leverage on this question, therefore, we must bring additional information to bear. We identify four more questions that tap individual's views about democracy. These are:
• Even though democracies have problems, it is better than the alternatives;
• In democracies, the economic system runs badly;
• Democracies are indecisive; and
• Democracies are not good about maintaining order.
We code the responses to these 5 questions so that higher values correspond to more sympathetic views about democracy, and then conduct a principal components confirmatory factor analysis. There is strong support for the claim that these questions tap a common underlying dimension, which we label Support for Democracy. The estimated Cronbach's alpha score for these 5 indicators is 0.71, and the factors load onto the underlying dimension relatively equally. Since it is unlikely that these factors are orthogonal to each other, the underlying factor is scored using an oblique rotation. The resulting index is scaled to have a zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1 and ranges from approximately -4 to +2, where again higher values representing greater support for democracy.
Having established an empirical measure of our dependent variable, we turn next to its individual-level correlates. This paper has asked how social trust relates to democratic support. To measure social trust, we utilize responses to the question, "Do you agree that, in this country, most people can be trusted or is it that one needs to be very careful?" Of the 80,000 respondents for whom we have answers, roughly a quarter (26.89%) state that most people can be trusted. We create a dichotomous variable where '1' is coded as having answered that most people are trustworthy and '0' has having answered that one can never be to careful.
Our other measure of interest concerns membership in voluntary associations.
Membership, and the social capital it connotes, is thought to increase democratic support by developing society's stock of social capital and by teaching citizens the civic skills required to flourish in an open and democratic society (Tocqueville, 1956; Putnam, 1993) . 7 We take a very inclusive view of which associations should matter and if respondents claim to be members of church organizations, cultural activities, labor unions, political parties and local political organizations, human rights groups and conservation groups, professional associations, youth groups, sports/recreation groups, women's groups, peace movements, health-related groups, or any other group of their choosing, we count them as a 'Member' and the corresponding variable is coded '1'. If a respondent does not claim to be a member of any of these associations, she is coded '0' on this variable.
We also include a set of demographic controls for whether the respondent is female, married, and a parent, and for the respondent's age. We mean-center the age variable at 40. 8 We also account for whether the respondent has less than a high school education and for whether the respondent is presently employed. Other than age, all the demographic characteristics are coded dichotomously. Finally, we control for four possible alternative explanations. Scholars have argued for some time as to the compatibility of religion and democracy, and we therefore include a measure of individual's religiosity, which we operationalize using data on the frequency of attendance at worship services. 9 Next, we account for whether more tolerant individuals, who might also be more trusting, are more likely to favor democratic practices (Weldon 2006 Baker. This scale, formed by a confirmatory factor analysis, consists of five items:
whether one considers abortion ever justifiable, the importance of providing children 8 More specifically, our rescaled age variable is (age-40)/10. We divide the mean-centered age by 10 to bring the scale of the variable closer to that of the dependent variable and therefore to maximize significant digits in the estimated coefficients. For similar practices, see Jusko and Shively (2005) and Huber et al (2005) . 9 The religiosity measure is trichotomous: '1' indicates individuals who report attending worship services less than once a year; '2' indicates those who attend more than once a year and at special festivals; and '3' codes those who report attending at least once a month or more frequently. 10 As alternative measures, we also considered responses to questions asking respondents how they felt about having neighbors of a different race, or who were immigrants. The results reported below do not change. 
Model and Results
We begin our analysis by estimating regressions predicting the level of democratic support as a function of social trust, associational membership, and the set of demographic and alternative attitudinal variables described above.
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11 Autonomy is measured by forming an index from answers to four questions. Respondents are asked whether they value teaching children the following values: determination, independence, obedience, and religious faith. The first two are coded '1' and the latter two '-1'. Thus, a respondent who agrees to all four values scores '0' on the index, while one who answers affirmatively only to the first two values scores '2' and one who answers affirmatively only to the latter two values scores '-2'. 12 Since the associational membership variable has the fewest usable observations, we also estimated these models excluding that variable in order to maximize the number of countries included in the analysis. Our Democracy's Effect on the Effect of Trust Figure 1 plots the estimated country-specific coefficient for trust against the country's score on the combined Freedom House scale. The Freedom House scale, which is also known as the Gastil Index, ranks countries on two seven-point scales for Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Combining these scales yields an index that ranges from 2 to 14. We rescale the index from 0-12 such that higher values go to countries whose citizens enjoy greater levels of freedom. This rescaled index forms the X-axis in Figure 1 . The top scatterplot in Figure 1 suggests a positive relationship between a country's freedom house score and the size of trust's effect on democratic support. As indicated by our summary of these results above, most countries' estimated coefficients are positive, though this is definitely more so at higher levels of the freedom house index. In the lower range of the X-axis, more countries are clustered along or are below the zero effect line (i.e., B(TRUST)=0). Figure 1 thus supports our contention that the effect of trust on democratic support is conditional on national context.
To explore this argument further, we turn to a multi-level model of support for democracy. 13 The basic intuition behind a multi-level model is best expressed as thinking of the research question as a two-stage process. In the first stage, country-specific estimates of some independent variable on the dependent variable of interest are obtained, just as we did above. In the second stage, these estimates are treated as dependent variables themselves and modeled as a function of some contextual variable suggested by theory. In our case, this contextual variable is the country's Freedom House score. 14 The two regressions models implied above are referred to as level one and level two regressions respectively.
There are two approaches to estimating such multi-level models. The first, commonly used in the social science literature, is to estimate the two stages separately, and then to correct the standard errors in the second stage manually. This is the approach used by the various contributors to Kedar and Shively (2005) . 15 The second approach is to estimate the model in a single-stage, which requires estimating the reduced form of the system of equations. Estimation can be done using maximum likelihood or empirical Bayes techniques. The one-stage model is substantively equivalent to the two-stage model, but is typically more efficient too (Beck 2005: 258) . Below, we report results 13 The special issue of Political Analysis edited by Orit Kedar and W. Phillips Shively is an excellent introduction of these methods for political scientists (Kedar and Shively 2005) . See also Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) , Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) , and Steenbergen and Jones (2002) . 14 We also used the country's Polity score as an alternative indicator. We prefer the Freedom House score on theoretical grounds since its focus are the freedoms and liberties enjoyed by citizens, while the Polity measure focuses more on the institutional checks and balances for elites. Nevertheless, all results reported below are robust to the use of the Polity measure, and are available upon request from the authors. 15 For good discussions and applications of this two-stage estimation strategy, see Jusko and Shively (2005) , Lewis and Linzer (2005) , Huber et al (2005) , Duch and Stevenson (2005) , and Kedar (2005) .
from a one-stage model which we estimated using HLM 6.0, though our results hold if we use a two-stage estimation strategy instead.
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The level-1 (or individual-level) model can be written as
where Y ij is the dependent variable observed for individual 'i' in context 'j', X 1ij is the independent variable of interest (eg., trust in our case), X 2ij through X kij are (k-1) control variables, and ε ij is the error term. β 5 to β k are (k-5) coefficients to be estimated, and η 0j
and η 1j are context-specific coefficients. All non-dichotomous individual-level variables are centered on the country-mean. The level-2 model has the level-1 intercept and coefficient on trust (η 1j ) as its dependent variables:
where W 1j (the Freedom House score) is a covariate in both the random-intercept (η 0j ) and random-coefficient (η 1j ) equations, and Z lj is a vector of l alternative country-level explanations. Specifically, Z lj contains measures of the country j's (1) average national income (log of GDP per capita), (2) average level of religiosity, 18 (3) mean level of tolerance, (4) mean level of support for strong leaders, and (5) mean score on the traditionalism scale. All level-2 variables are centered on the grand mean.
19 16 Results available from authors upon request. HLM refers to the general method of hierarchical linear modeling, as implemented in the program HLM 6.0 developed by Raudenbush, Bryk, and Congdon. 17 This presentation follows the notation used by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005) . 18 In analyses not shown here, we used two alternative country-level religious measures. First, we used data on the percent of the population that is Muslim (from Steven Fish) and Catholic (from Bruce Russett). Second, we used dummy variables for whether the majority of the population is Muslim or Catholic. We focus on these two religious traditions since both have been previously associated with values deemed antithetical to democracy (Huntington 1991). Our results do not change if we use these religious composition variables instead of the country's mean level of religiosity. 19 Level-1 variables are centered on the group mean and level-2 variables on the grand mean to make the intercept interpretable. Thus, using Model 1 as an example, the estimated intercept is the predicted Table 2 below: democratic support score for a female, unmarried, educated but unemployed individual of age 40, with mean levels of religiosity, traditionalism, without any voluntary association membership, who does not believe strong leaders are good or that children should be taught tolerance, and who does not believe most people can be trusted. Table 2 Table 2 . The predicted democratic support score for an individual with average scores on all non-dichotomous variables and 0's on the dichotomous ones is 0.54 (recall the range of the DV is ~-3.5 to 2). Thus, this average individual tends to favor democratic forms of governance, which accords with our initial analysis. Turning to the other individual-level variables, all are statistically significantnot surprising given the sample size -and have signs in the expected direction. The largest substantive effects are for whether one thinks a strong leader is good (-0.28), has lower levels of education (-0.16), and is trusting (0.14). While the first two reduce support for democracy, those who are more trusting express greater support for democracy. The individual-level results therefore appear to support the conventional wisdom that trust bolsters support for democracy.
The bottom of Table 2 presents the variance components. Both the randomintercept and random-coefficient term are statistically significant, indicating that there remains important country-level variation in the average level of democratic support and in the effect of trust on democratic support. Observing the changes in these variance components as we add the country-level intercept terms and the cross-level interactions will also provide a sense of how much explanatory power these add.
Model 2 adds the country-level intercept terms. However, as the results indicate, doing so adds little to the explanatory power of the model, reducing the unexplained cross-national variation by only 7.7% over the baseline model. Therefore, we turn to Model 3, which adds the cross-level interaction terms. Doing so has an important effect. 
CONCLUSION
The democratic utility of trust is therefore contingent upon the context in which trust exists. Trust alone explains neither support for democracy nor other non-democratic regimes. The correlation between trust and democracy is in fact mediated and influenced by the virtue of citizens living in freer societies. Trust in non-democratic societies is not linked to greater forms of support for democracy. In fact, trust appears to be linked to support for less democracy in less free societies. Therefore the supposition that trust is necessary to forge a more democratic political culture is faulty. In this paper we illustrate that trust in non-democratic society has little effect on support for democracy. Only in democracies does trust effect support for democracy. The operative democratic capacity of trust fully depends on the overall political context. 
